Blu-Ray

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BRXL-PC6U2B is SN-506AB

SE-506CB/RSBD is SE-506CB

BDR-XD05W

DIG-79102 is Panasonic UJ-260 is Matshita

rpc1 and rpc2

  • RPC1 is a scheme that makes the playing software manage and control regioned playback.
  • RPC2 is a scheme that makes the drive manage and control access. http://www.dvdcca.org/rpc.html
  • Most RPC2 drives will refuse to return CSS Keys when the region setting of the disc and drive mismatch. For such drives software like AnyDVD must brute force the keys. If well implemented RPC2 will make it impossible to play a disc from the wrong region (Matshita).
  • A firmware that has been patched to RPC1 doesn't care, on any level, what region(s) the disc has, and the drive has no region setting itself.
  • With an RPC1 firmware you must manage the regioning of your playback software or OS, with additional software. http://forum.rpc1.org/viewtopic.php?t=239
  • RPC1 does not remove CSS protection, the content is, and remains scrambled.

Also Matshita Drives seem to have additional hardware above the firmware to enforce rpc2

Protections

  • Some drives are riplocked slowing them down so Media Code Speed Edit
  • Cinavia Protection
    • The Blu-ray Disc implementation of Cinavia is designed to cover two use-cases: the first is the provision of a Cinavia watermark on all movie theater soundtracks released via film distribution networks; the second use-case is for the provision of a Cinavia watermark on all Blu-ray Disc releases that points to the presence of an accompanying AACS key. If a "theatrical release" watermark is detected in a consumer Blu-ray Disc audio track, the accompanying video is deemed to have been sourced from a "cam" recording. If the "AACS watermark" is present in the audio tracks, but no accompanying and matching AACS key is found on the disc, then it is deemed to have been a "rip" made by copying to a second blank Blu-ray Disc.

History

On 5 June 2009, the licensing agreements for AACS were finalized, which were updated to make Cinavia detection on commercial Blu-ray Disc players a requirement.[12]

On July 3, 2009, Maxim Anisiutkin published an open source DVD Audio watermark detector and neutralizer[13] computer program to the SourceForge web site. The software package contains a detailed description of the method and embedding parameters used in creating the DVD Audio or SDMI (Secure Digital Music Initiative) watermark, which was created by Verance Inc and was the earlier version of the Cinavia watermarking technology.

From January 2013 onwards, attempts were made by third-party software suppliers to make use of existing bugs and loopholes in Blu-ray Disc players to avoid Cinavia message triggering, but without any attempt being made at precisely removing the Cinavia signal from the audio. These attempts included iDeer Blu-ray Player, DVDFab[14] and AnyDVD HD (version 7.3.1.0) which used workarounds to avoid Cinavia-enabled software Blu-ray Disc players from triggering Cinavia detection messages.[15][16]

In August 2013, DVD-Ranger released a white paper detailing their methods for detecting, and subsequently removing, the present Cinavia signal from audio files.[16] The DVD-Ranger CinEx beta software synchronises and detects the Cinavia signal in the same way as a consumer Cinavia detection routine; these identified parts of the audio stream are permanently removed, removing the Cinavia signal. Post-processing can be used to try to "fill-in" the audible gaps created.[16]

There are claims[17] that Cinavia can be removed using open source software like Audacity with an extracted audio file from a video source. The audio file is processed by decreasing pitch by -13%; the processed audio file is then merged back into the video source. This renders the Cinavia watermark unreadable.

The best Cinavia removal method was provided[18] by Myce user Cienoway. Several people confirmed[19] that the Cienoway method works. The detail of the method was not disclosed. However Cienoway claimed his computer code was extremely simple and broke Cinavia fundamentally, so no remedy was possible.[20] It was not clear when Cienoway will disclose his Cinavia removal method publicly.

This Stuff is Nuts

Remove It?

BD+

  • BD+ is effectively a virtual machine embedded in authorized players. It allows content providers to include executable programs on Blu-ray Discs.
    • examine the host environment, to see if the player has been tampered with. Every licensed playback device manufacturer must provide the BD+ licensing authority with memory footprints that identify their devices.
    • verify that the player's keys have not been changed.
    • execute native code, possibly to patch an otherwise insecure system.
    • transform the audio and video output. Parts of the content will not be viewable without letting the BD+-program repair it.

It is a java VM.....so java decryption, like smart cards http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BD%2B

BD Lite

Playing/Ripping

DVDFAB: The PS3 doesn't support MKV, so, that part's irrelevant. The structure that DVDFab outputs can be written to disc (and is made for doing so), but, it doesn't actually REMOVE the Cinavia. It, instead, makes the media a "TRUSTED_SOURCE" by adding AACS encryption to it. The Cinavia detection code sees the valid AACS certificate and goes on its merry way.

Alternative Network Streaming:

XBMC http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kodi_%28software%29

  • Uses full GPU, so no player....but still on rpi, works great. OpenELEC.
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